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This article will examine the effects on life in the north midlands during the
first civil war, 1642 - 1646, and relate these to the absence of clubmen risings
in the region. In recent years historians have offered various explanations for
the risings of the neutralist clubmen in the south west and south and west
midlands during 1645.2 The most recent of these goes farther and attempts
to explain why there were no such risings in other areas. Simon Osborne's
1994 article in 'Mifffarnf J-{j.story, offers a multi-layered explanation for the
risings in Worcestershire and for the lack of risings in neighbouring counties,
Warwickshire, Northamptonshire and Leicestershire. His complex of expla-
nations for the non-appearance of clubmen in the latter counties centres partly
upon the ability of the local garrisons to maintain regular collections of
taxation. This more orderly conduct was less likely to inflame local resentment
which could build into anger. This argument also stresses the ability of these
same garrisons to maintain order amongst themselves and overawe the local
rural and urban populations.3 Part of this paper will examine Osborne's thesis
in the light of the experience of the counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire,
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire, embracing one of the counties
examined by Dr Osborne and four contingent to it. It is first necessary to
present a brief narrative of the war to provide context, and then taking the
counties in turn to highlight features identified by Dr Osborne. Finally the
paper will turn to the question of the stability of the region in the second half
of the war, the period which it might be judged would have created the right
conditions for clubmen risings.
The civil war in the north midlands has had to be re-assessed recently. For
a considerable period it was seen as a region dominated by a collection of
what were termed 'rob-carriers', referring to the supposed predilection of
royalist commanders for robbing carriers, or 'former tinkers', a reference to
royalist claims that Parliament's commanders were of lowly origins. As a
result there has been little attempt to examine the structures of the rival
organisations or to re-examine the historical narrative. Partly this is caused
by the nature of the source materials. Many royalist papers were destroyed
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at the end of the war, resulting in a skewing of the picture. The material at
the centre of this paper, derived as it is from the local communities, has
allowed for the picture to be redeveloped from the bottom upwards.4 Essen-
tially for the north midlands, the story has a four-fold aspect. In the wake of
the king's departure from Nottingham, the impetus lay with the parliamen-
tarians who had been in hiding whilst the royalists were in the ascendant. By
December 1642 these parliamentarians had control of Derby and Nottingham,
and the only royalist force in the field, Sir Francis Whortley's dragoons, had
been driven out and the only garrison, the amateur soldiers at Bretby in south
Derbyshire had been forced to surrender the house. The king responded by
sending back the region's active royalists to their homes from the field army
at Oxford to retake the initiative. The second stage of the war was a battle
for supremacy, in which the royalists had gained the upper hand overall by
the following summer. However, they had failed to completely suppress the
parliamentarians who most importantly held onto the county towns in four
of the counties, something which was to have dire consequences for the
royalists in the following year. The defeat of the royalist army at Marston
Moor in 1644 heralded the next stage which saw the destruction of much of
the royalist hold on the midlands, both by outside forces and by indigenous
parliamentarians. This process accelerated after Naseby, becoming the final
stage in which the royalists were pinned into the immediate vicinities of their
major garrisons, a state of affairs which existed until the royalists were
wheedled out of their strongholds one by one.
Much of the evidence for the realities of the midlands situation comes from
the accounts of local constables with whom the administrations worked. As
with much local government, central policy stood or fell upon the effective-
ness of the constables and the consensus reached between him (or her) and
the local communities. From their papers we know a good deal about the
methods of collecting war-time taxes. Some 28 sets of accounts covering the
north midland counties survive. This number does not represent a large
proportion of the parishes in the region but compared with the rest of England
and especially Wales, it is a relatively rich haul representing about half of
the surviving sets for the two nations. Many sets had not seen the war out.
The constable of Rugeley in Staffordshire had watched his house burn down,
taking with it the accounts for 1643-4.5 Others were simply not preserved;
the constable at Edwinstowe in Nottinghamshire wrote in 1647 in a space left
in the accounts:
'whereas ther wear manye maightye accompts in the years 1642, 1643 1644 betwixt the
townsmen of Edwinstowe and Myles Ouldham the then constable of the same towne w[hi]ch
by reason of time of the ware could not nether then nor this daye be p[er]fected'6
Even so, the surviving sets offer enough information to reconstruct the systems
employed by the commissioners of array and the soldiers in their counties.
In Staffordshire the return of the local royalists and the immediate attempt
of local parliamentarians to defeat them, ended the county's bid for neutralism.
In November 1642 a special sessions of the peace had ordered the creation
of a 'third force' to expel forces of both sides which might attempt to enter
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the county. Instead, by the end of the year people in the county were steadily
drawn into the funding networks. Petty constables had visited the 'commis-
sioners' at Lichfield as early as 29 November 1642 within days of the Justices
of the Peace's attempt to declare neutrality. They were again called to Stafford
by sheriff Comberford in February and by May a provisional levy of £2000
pounds had been imposed, and collectors appointed for each of the hundreds.
The proportions of tax allotted to each division and then to each parish seems
to have been related to the proportions used in the levies of ship money, the
most recent all-embracing county wide tax. One of the best sets of accounts
in the country is the one from Mavesyn Ridware in Offloe Hundred, Staf-
fordshire.1 Here the accounts reveal the process of allotment and collection.
Constables in office between 1643 and 1645 each travelled fortnightly to
Lichfield to hand over contribution to the treasurer and former cathedral
chorister, captain Jeffrey Glasier of Richard Bagot's Foot. Evidence from
elsewhere in the county supports this, in Seisdon Hundred constables were
expected to travel to their respective garrison, in this case Dudley.s The costs
to the communities of the royalist tax known as Contribution were high and
they escalated. The Mavesyn Ridware accounts show the yearly contribution
totals for 1642-3, 1643-4 and 1644-5. In the first year (which runs for the
period October to October), the total paid was £30 13s 7d. By 1643-4 this
had risen to £144 17s 4d, but in 1644-5 the total had fallen slightly to £128
13s 3d. However the total village outlay was even higher, for during the latter
two years there were periods when money was also paid over to the parlia-
mentarians at Stafford. In 1643-4 payments of Parliament's Weekly Assess-
ment had only amounted to £47 5s Od but the year following it rose to £87
7s 9d accounting for the smaller payments to royalist coffers that year. It is
difficult to compare these amounts with the pre-war levies, but a few such
comparisons from Staffordshire can be drawn. At Biddulph levies in 1640
amounted to £8 9s 7d, whilst in 1645 they had risen to £26 12s 6d, approxi-
mately a three-fold rise.9 In Rugeley, surviving accounts not burnt in Robert
Burton's house show pre-war levies at around £17, whilst those for 1644-5
had reached £43 13s 4d, again approaching a three-fold increase. The income
of garrisons too naturally increased, with Lichfield drawing some £48 per
month from Offloe Hundred in 1643 and something like £100 per month in
late 1645.10
In Nottinghamshire the best set of accounts come from Upton near Newark. 11
The other accounts in the county play an important supporting role and all
demonstrate clearly that the posturing of the two sides in the summer of 1642
introduced expensive burdens to the villages. In late August that year the
trained bands were summoned to Nottingham at short notice for the 'Raising
of the Standard'. To get them from the Newark area quickly required horses
and at Upton three were hired at a cost of 3s 3d. The soldiers' wages cost
16s, the constable had to accompany them which cost the village 6d in
expenses and 2d in horse hire. The village armour was in a poor state and
needed 2s 6d worth of repairs and another shilling was spent on gunpowder
and match. Finally a month's pay, lOs 6d, was handed over to the high
constable bringing the total to £1 13s lId. Nearby Coddington too had to find
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horses for its trained bandsman and a boy to help the constable to bring the
horses back again with wages, powder and match the bill there came to lOs
6d.12 Despite the hurried activity it is not certain that these soldiers arrived
before the standard was raised, possibly they did not, accounting for the poor
military turnout at Nottingham on 23 August 1642.
During the next few months the region was on the periphery of the war,
but not isolated from it. The number of travellers along Upton's roads was
already being swollen by refugees from the rebellion in Ireland. From the
beginning of 1642, refugees streamed through the midlands. During the year
94 men, women and children from Ireland passed through Upton, some of
them were maimed soldiers, one woman colonist had been born in Southwell.
There were other travellers too: maimed soldiers from the king' s army, wounded
in the early battles began to pass through in late October or early November,
seven had travelled through Upton before the end of the year. Coddington
saw some 78 refugees pass through between March 1642 and the following
January including five soldiers maimed in the autumn fighting. Probably some
of them were people who had already passed through Upton or were about
to do so. Some travellers believed that succour lay with the king and a constant
trail of them followed him to York or Lincoln.
The burden placed by the unfolding war upon Nottinghamshire villages
increased dramatically over the next few years. By February 1643 the
Coddington constables were making trips to the commissioners at Newark for
the first recorded monthly meeting.13 Thorpe constables were also at the
meetings, and copies of warrants were brought by Edward Milden at 4d each
to take home to show his neighbours, the social equals who would share the
village's administrative posts and duties with him. 14For Thorpe these warrants
represented the beginning of regular royalist taxation which was set at £1 lOs
Od a week for the next year. Commissioners of array, through the high and
petty constables were soon able to collect taxation from most of the county,
including places as near to the parliamentarian garrison at Nottingham as
Arnold to the north-east and Clifton to the south. The exceptions were the
villages to the south and west of Nottingham, from where only the parliamen-
tarians could gather tax most of the time, because royalist forces could not
usually cross Trent Bridge.ls At Upton the total receipts of the 1645 levies
brought in a total of £133 Os5d and the high level of taxes and the continuing
ancillary costs resulted in the 1646 total disbursements remaining at £140 8s
Od.
The accounts from Upton also reveal how the demands of war reached deep
into the workings of the rural community. We know what was produced, who
produced it and who consumed it. In Upton dairy products were provided
chiefly by George Bilbie. Arable crops grown in Upton included peas, pro-
vided by John Lambe, George Bilby, Rowland Robinson, William Parlethorpe,
Richard Aseling, John Chappell, William Kitchen and William Gill. Wheat
was grown by George Bilby, rye by William Robinson, and oats by Salomen
Bettinson and Rowland Robinson. There was a variety of livestock reared in
the village, sheep were kept by Daniel Koe, William Kitchen, and George
Parlethorpe, whilst pigs were kept by the wives of William Gill and Richard
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Skinner. Ducks could be provided by Robert Parnell's wife and chickens by
Thomas Bayley. Produced goods are also in evidence: linen ware was made
by several women including 'Kirke's wife', 'Thomas Kitchen's wife' and
'Stephen Shepherd's wife'. Bread was baked by Thomas Culling in 1645.
Service industries were apparent too, ale and board was available at the
Kirkes' inn, but ale was provided by others, including the Skinners, the
Plowmans and the Parnells, and constable Jane Kitchen owned brewing
equipment. Edward Harper and William Foster undertook metal work, with
at least the latter shoeing horses for the army.16 Other services were also
required: reading warrants was sometimes undertaken by Mr Oglethorpe when
the constable was away or not literate, and George Elliot often acted as a
scrivener, copying warrants and writing up the accounts. All of these goods
have been recorded only because the war efforts was drawing them from the
Nottinghamshire rural economy.
The villagers with the larger houses were those chosen to billet soldiers
allocated to Upton. Evidence from other accounts elsewhere demonstrates that
the constables periodically drew up lists of the substantial householders for
this purpose. At Upton we find the people most often referred to as innholders
were selected for this duty. The Kirkes's inn usually had soldiers loding or
convalescing there; Thomas Kitchen's household at Lane Head was another
which provided lodging for soldiers and stabling for horses, and more soldiers
lodged with John Kitchen. In 1644 George Bilby and William Gill jointly
quartered four gentlemen, possibly officers or involved in the administration
of the war. No precise figures for billeting costs are found in these accounts,
but it is probable that they were in the region of 4d per day for one man or
one horse. I?
The resources of this county were divided three ways for most of the war
and variations within that pattern characterise the entire war. In the immediate
vicinity of Leicester, the parliamentarian county committee was able to collect
assessments most of the time although at the end of 1643 they were having
to be subsidised by money collected in Kent. At the same time committee
members themselves were allegedly not able to collect rents from their estates
outside the town walls. The county as a whole was divided between the two
royalist garrisons at Belvoir Castle and Ashby de la Zouch; the lion's share
going to the massive garrison and administrative centre established at Ashby.
Principal accounts in Leicestershire, include Branston, Stathern and Waltham
on the Wolds, all belonging to Framland and East Goscote hundreds assigned
to Belvoir. The lone set from within Ashby's territory, the accounts from
Belton demonstrate that the increasing burden on the village communities
even in the early stages of the war involved a threefold increase on the
constables' levy alone.I8 The Waltham Accounts show that even in 1645 the
Belvoir garrison could collect contribution on a regular basis, levying £99 16s
4d from the village that year. The accounts of nearby Branston that same year
exhibit the dilemma of divided territorial control recording £50 paid to Belvoir
and £90 to the parliamentarians at Leicester. Moreover, both the Waltham on
the Wolds and the Branston accounts suggest that regular payments had been
made to both sides for much of the war. Only during the period from autumn
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1643 to summer 1645 were the royalists in complete control.19
Considerably less can be said of Derbyshire and Rutland. In Derbyshire
the commission of array structure seems to have been quite sophisticated,
employing a system of devolved government. Part of the commission was
based at Ashbourne to deal with the adjacent High Peak area. Most of the
commissioners probably remained at Tutbury, although it is pbssible that there
was also a contingent in the Chesterfield area. Chesterfield was the scene of
the Marquis of Newcastle's Councils of War in late 1643, and the area was
home to two of the commissioners of array. There are no surviving constables
accounts which cover the early part of the war and so the taxation details
remain largely a mystery, even though the division of the county between the
garrisons can be worked out. It would seem that county borders did not dictate
divisions between garrison territory whereas hundredal or warpentakal ones
did. For instance tax was collected in Derbyshire by the Tutbury garrison in
Staffordshire. In this case the taxes were probably being levied in the Honour
of Tutbury the areas in both counties charged with the upkeep of the castle.
However no such traditional arrangement would present a precedent for the
allocation of Repton and Gresley hundred to the Leicestershire garrison at
Ashby de la Zouch.
In Rutland the taxation process only becomes clear after the county was
in the hands of the parliamentarians from 1644. The village of Preston paid
tax to the county committee at Burley House for much of the time, but on
some occasions had to make payments to the committee of neighbouring
Leicestershire.20 At Hambleton, about three miles away, it was the Burley and
Rockingham garrisons which drew upon the resources of Abel Barker's
estates. Between 16 December 1644 and late June 1645, Barker despatched
£19 Os9d worth of peas, oats, straw, beer and 'provision' to 'Burley' at weekly
intervals.He alsoprovided five horses,whichhe valued at £40 toRockingham.21
In 1645 the Monthly Tax levied on the county's five hundreds amounted to
£510 lOsOd,with the village of Hambleton paying some £16 lOsOda month,
only Whissendine, Ashwell and Burley paying more.22
The weight of evidence for the period before late summer 1644 points to
the type of stability which Osborne rightly suggests would obviate the finan-
cial impetus for risings. Taxation collection was regular well into 1644 in
many of the villages in the region. Even in this period there were areas where
such stability did not exist, parts of Staffordshire adjacent to the garrisons of
Lapley in the south west and Eccleshall in the north changed hands with the
vicissitudes of war. The former changed hands twice in quick succession and
the former once in the second half of 1643. The situation in Derbyshire in
the same period was far more confused than that in other counties because
of the rapid establishment of royalist garrisons. Moreover all the villages in
the immediate vicinity of all the county towns were faced with royalist
incursions throughout the war.
If the first part of the war was generally stable, the campaign in the Newark
area in March 1644 heralded a sea-change. At the beginning of the month
Sir John Meldrum and an army of? ,000placed the royalist garrison at Newark
under close siege. The resources of the area around the town were stretched
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during the next three weeks. Meldrum's defeat by Prince Rupert and Lord
Loughborough was followed by billeting of royalist regiments from Lough-
borough's North Midland Army which took peas and oats to feed their horses
and tried to take new mounts from Upton.23 The Upton Accounts clearly show
a new phase in the war when resources were used more. Within ten days of
the siege, the village was contributing labourers to the rebuilding and expan-
sion of Newark's defences. Thorpe village accounts show that the villages
were charged with the construction of certain amount of earthworks, assessed
in ten-yard stretches.24 We can get some idea of the costs involved from the
Upton accounts, labourers were escorted to the bulwarks by the constable and
they did a day's work for 8d each, which compares with 8d for a day's work
mowing hay in Lincolnshire in 1621, or between 6d and 10d a day as a foot
soldier.25 However, events further north were to have a major effect on the
north midland counties. On 11 April the Yorkshire royalists, charged with
defending the Marquis of Newcastle's rear whilst he tried to halt the advance
of the Scottish Covenanter Army into the north of England, were defeated
at Selby. Suddenly the whole of the royalist north was under threat and York
itself in peril. The Marquis dashed south, flung himself and his foot regiments
into York and sent the horse south to camp in Nottinghamshire. That this
drained the stocks of fodder in the midlands is apparent in the Upton accounts
where the entries from the end of April, through May are dominated by the
demands of horse regiments for peas, hay and oats as well as for new billeting
arrangements.26 The effects of having Goring's horse in the region were felt
in Derbyshire too. Colonel John Freschville wrote to Lord Loughborough in
May 1644 complaining that Goring was expecting a 'greater quantity' from
the county than 'the place can possibly afford' .27
Back at Upton Meldrum's three-week stay had also heralded another new
feature, the payment of taxes to Nottingham, and despite the royalists' re-
newed hegenomy of the region or the constables' subsequent attempt to delete
the sums from the accounts, parliamentarian taxation was not to end even for
communities so close to royalist garrisons. By September such chaos had
increased on the Derbyshire and Staffordshire border, with Sir Andrew Kniveton,
governor of Tutbury writing:
...our contribution being much lessened by reason of the country's poverty and the enemy
appearing daily in our quarters, and having no better a means of supply than by sending to
particular men for some small sums such as they are well able to bear...
Here though there were still acknowledged hierarchies within the collapsing
war effort. Kniveton continued:
...I make bold to aquaint you herewith and to present a copy of one of the notes (I intend to
send) to your view, with a desire that you will please to approve of this or such other form
as your lordship pleases and return it back this night, the occasion being urgent.28
In other areas these hierarchies were being challenged and the royalist war
effort was becoming internally riven. In north-east Leicestershire the governor
of Belvoir Castle ceased to recognise the authority of his commander Lord
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Loughborough. Since the summer of 1644 and the flight of the Marquis of
Newcastle, Gervase Lucas argued Loughborough's commission was null and
void, as he had been at one stage Newcastle's appointee. Lucas stopped
attending councils of war, refused to help Loughborough's attempt to rescue
the garrison at Wingfield, and challenged his commander's right to allot
taxation areas. Lucas's men were collecting money from all of Framland
hundred, which was shared between the two garrisons, and from East Goscote
and Gartree which had been assigned to Ashby alone. Moreover, Loughbor-
ough also accused Lucas of badly treating royalist supporters, persecuting a
Mr Yates whose two sons had been killed in the king's service. Such actions
could not win hearts and minds and belie some degree of panic. The recipients
of Kniveton's loan letters may too have felt betrayed by those supposedly
protecting them from arbitrary demands. Lucas's action was not solely in-
spired by rivalry with Lord Loughborough, nor was it entirely as Loughbor-
ough asserted, corruption. Belvoir's financial situation was becoming desper-
ate. Lincolnshire, where a good deal of Lucas's taxation had come from was
now in the hands of the Eastern Association forces and administration.29
Similar disputes to the Lucas/Loughborough quarrel beset Staffordshire
where Thomas Leveson governor of Dudley accused the Lichfield garrison
of forcibly interfering in Dudley's tax collection. The dispute dragged on into
the following year when Leveson went on to allege that the county's com-
missioners of array were not authorising the collection of monies due to his
garrison.3D These quarrels were not helped by the confusion of commands at
the level immediately above Lord Loughborough. Four of his five counties
had been under the command of the Marquis of Newcastle, which had itself
dissolved when the Marquis left the country; the fifth, Staffordshire, had been
grouped under Rupert's command since Spring 1644. This not only allowed
Lucas could claim that Loughborough lacked authority, but also allowed
Leveson to appeal over his head to Prince Rupert in 1644 and in 1645 to Prince
Maurice.
The decline in royalist effectiveness was not yet clear to all observers. A
petition sent to Parliament from Leicestershire in late 1644, protested the
ineffectiveness of the county committee in dealing with the royalists. It
claimed that:
...the enemy's are so much strengthened and increased, that the well-affected are daily exposed
to the loss of liberty, their goods to plunder, and their rents sequestered and seized on by the
adverse party, that till of late had never the boldnes or power to attempt it.
This claim that the people of Leicestershire were now subject to the 'now
unbounded enemy' does not sit well with either our understanding of the
situation in late 1643 when the royalists were ascendent, or late 1644 when
they plainly were not.31 This petition's claims on this point only really make
sense if we put them into a context of collapsing war-effort when sporadic
tax collection had replaced effective systems. It was a period in which Abel
Barker a member of the Rutland County Committee could question the value
of the cause when it could not protect him or his property and a fellow
countyman Francis Wayte claimed 'that the parliamentarian cause did not
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preserve his house from plunder or stop 'myself [being] carried away as most
of our gentry already are'.32
There is other evidence that the breakdown in the royalist control of the
region was having widespread effects. At Upton just after 3 July 1645,
William Robinson was murdered by soldiers fromNewark. ConstableWilliam
Cullen arrested the soldiers and led them toNewark. On 10July, he, Robinson's
wife and other witnesses went to give evidence before the Council of War.
By that time there were parliamentarian soldiers in the area, some based at
nearby Norwel1.33Taxes were being paid to both Newark and Nottingham but
the collections were less regular. Parliamentarian journals even suggested that
the Newark forces were threatening to burn down empty houses, on the basis
that their owners had fled rather than pay taxes, whilst they were collecting
arrears. Whilst there is no corroboration for this claim, there is no doubt that
royalist systems were breaking down and new parliamentarian ones were not
yet established to take over from them.34Evidence from the extensive estates
of the Mellish family, covering several villages in the north east of Notting-
hamshire indicate that the dysfunction engendered by the breakdown of control
was also affecting rents collection. On the eve of war total rents collected
ranged between £628-£690 per year. For 1642-3 they remained high at £650
14s 1d, and the following year they were still at £652 8s 1d; they remained
the same into 1644-5 but by 1645-6 they had fallen to £410 4s 9d (a 37%
fall).35This in part must be because the Mellish estates were on the fringes
of territory which the Newark based royalists could control by 1645. The
cumulative effects of the levies upon the tenants' ability to pay their rents
would also be a factor.
It is possible that for many places such disorderly behaviour was a brief
occurrence with limited effects. Elsewhere in the region, where control passed
swiftly into the hands of the parliamentarian forces and administration, the
changeover could be marked not by instability, but by a sense of aija vu as
parliamentarian levies were set at almost exactly the same rates as royalist
ones. The Mavesyn Ridware accounts show that in some areas where there
was a prolonged period of dual assessment, both sides made an effort to reduce
the possible problems by lowering their levies by approximately one third.
As part of the surrender terms at Welbeck in Autumn 1645, the parliamen-
tarians, under Thomas Gell, agreed to collect royalist contribution represent-
ing the back pay of the besieged garrison.
For the people of the area surrounding Newark the cost of the war escalated
at the end of 1645 when the town was again besieged by Lord Leven's
Covenanter army and Sydenham Pointz's Northern Association Army. This
siege lasted some six months but even when it ended in May 1646, the
departure of first the Scots, then the royalists and finally the northern par-
liamentarians did not significantly reduce the costs of war. One mark of how
little was to change is the way that 6May, the day the siege ended, was passed
by the constable of Upton in collecting parliamentarian taxes in Morton.
Whilst the Scots' levy may have ended that very day, he now had to hand
over all the money to the parliamentarian county committee in Nottingham
and two week's money, representing the period since the siege, was paid over
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on 26 May. Newark was now afflicted by plague and occupied by John
Hutchinson's regiment from Nottingham. His wife recorded this as the 'great-
est danger of all' he underwent and recounted with relief, that 'it so pleased
God that neither he nor any of these fresh men caught the infection, which
was so raging there that it almost desolated the place'36
This would seem to suggest that the infection was closely related to the
unhygienic living and diet of the straitened garrison and that the soldiers with
fresh food and supplies were able to avoid infection at this stage. On Monday
11 May workers from the nearby villages were set to work to destroy the
earthworks established by both sides. The labourers from Upton were given
the task of demolishing the king's Scone on the Spittle which they themselves
had constructed two years earlier. Many of the earthworks were levelled or
at least rendered unserviceable within days. Work was quickly halted by the
plague in Newark and the villages sealed themselves off from the outside
world as much as possible. On 26 May, constable Richard Gibson at Upton
gave IOd worth of bread, cheese and beer to 'six people of Newark which
the watchman kept out of the towne the[y] desiringe relief, returned to the
wood'.37 The payments to support the people in the plague visited towns all
around the country continue to appear in the Upton Accounts throughout much
of the rest of 1646.
Mass movement of people across the country had really begun in 1641 with
the migration of refugees from Ireland, but now a great throng of people was
moving along England's roads. The year from 6 May 1646, the first after the
war ended in the vicinity of Upton, saw at least 58 Irish men, women and
children pass through, along with three disabled people, nine soldiers returning
home, at least nine children, six women and eleven men of various qualities,
in all at least 96 people. Initially they may have used Upton's roads to avoid
plague ridden Newark and many people would have been turned away from
the town by watchmen there. Yet it is clear that the plague was only one reason
for people passing through Upton and the surrounding villages as it cannot
account for the continuing traffic of the displaced which continued for several
years. Three years later, in 1649, the numbers on the road were even greater.
This time sixteen Irish women, one Irish child and one Irish man passed
through Upton. In addition there were sixteen women, seven men, seventeen
disabled people, eight children, 24 discharged soldiers, eleven maimed sol-
diers, fifteen people of unspecified gender as well as a further six 'companies'
of poor people and sixteen Irish 'companies' of unspecified numbers which
passed through. Payments to these travellers cost the community over £2, or
about 3% of total expenditure for that year or about 5% of the village payments
other than those for the Monthly Tax and billeting charges. Despite Professor
Wood's assertion that 'the normal trade ofthe countryside soon began to flow
into the market place', Newark's role as a major communications route was
seriously disrupted.38 People now used other roads. Upton was passed through
by people generally moving north to south or vice versa; York, London and
Parliament were common destinations. It is interesting that there was so much
traffic through Upton as the village was neither on the main roads north and
south, nor on the direct route between Nottingham and Newark. For much
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of the war period and after it seems likely that people following the Great
North Road were skirting around Newark to avoid the bridges and roads
damaged by siegeworks and fortifications, perhaps by way of Long Bennington,
Cottam, East Stoke, Fiskerton Ferry, Upton Norwell and Tuxford.39
In spite of the very great depredations and the overall uncertainty caused
by the collapse of the royalist war effort, no club risings took place in the
north midlands and this poses interesting questions. Dr Osbourne has ad-
dressed this issue in his recent work on the adjacent and overlapping parts
of the midlands. His offered solution in part relates to the establishment of
order in the regions. In those areas with the most effective military control,
and thus the most regular system of taxation, order and stability were pre-
served, and there was no need of any expression of popular outrage. Garrisons
in these areas were effective at minimising minor military incursions from
outside. Taxation collection probably entailed almost constant patrols. Evi-
dence from Colonel Staunton's regimental accounts suggests that responsi-
bility for collection entailed long journies, often to distant communities.40 This
could be fundamental to the preservation of order as the regular presence of
armed forces collecting taxes, would have had an intimidatory effect or may
have had the effect of enhancing a sense of security. In the north midlands
there are two problems with Osbourne's solution. Firstly it fails to explain
why the disorderly effect of marching armies passing through regions which
had, as he acknowledges, been a problem in Worcestershire did not cause
problems here. Indeed there had been many occasions when royalist and
parliamentarian armies marched through and lingered in the region. In 1643
and 1644 the royalists armies of Newcastle, Prince Rupert and Lord Goring
travelled through or even stayed for a considerable amount of time causing
considerable hardship.41 In 1645 the king's own army was in the region three
times between May and November. Parliamentarian armies, under firstly
Thomas Ballard, then Cromwell, Grey and Meldrum had been in the region
in 1643. Meldrum was in the region again in Spring 1644, the earl of Denbigh
in the south during June, Manchester in August and in 1645 the New Model
and the Scottish Army had all disrupted any sense of normality. We have seen
from the Upton accounts and from the material regarding the period of
Goring's stay in the region, that the burdens imposed by outside forces were
erratic and potentially destructive. Secondly, the period which saw the club-
men activity at its most intense in the south midlands, the marches and the
south west co-incided with the most destablised period in the north midlands.
The defeat of the North Midlands Army at Denton in October 1644 had seen
the end of its existence of a field army; from then onwards it was relegated
to being garrison force contributing to other armies. Regiments under the
argumentative colonels joined the king's army separately in May 1645 or as
a part of another recognised body such as the Newark Horse. The North
Midlands Army was still large enough to dominate significant areas around
the major garrisons, and it certainly ensured that Parliament's forces could
not hold the territory in the same thrall as Lord Loughborough's men had in
the period Autumn 1643 to Spring 1644.
The region was not entirely quiet, but disturbances in the area were an urban
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rather than a rural feature. As in royalist Chester the previous year, parlia-
mentarian Derby was beset by anti-tax riotS.42 In May 1645, two unnamed
women,
went up and down the town beating drums and making proclamations ... that such of the town
as were not willing to pay excise should join with them and they would beat the [excise]
commissioners out of town.
Attempts by the county committee to negotiate with them failed and as the
committee sat at the mayor's house, one of the women stood banging her drum
outside the window drowning out the debate. This tactic worked and the excise
was not collected again until July. When it was again levied a soldier was
seized by the townspeople and fastened to the bull ring in the market whilst
'the women did beat the drums as before' . It still proved impossible to collect
the money, despite orders from London. When the excise commissioners
could do their work again the tax was this time used primarily within the
county and not sent to London. Sir John Gell the governor of Derby partly
for his own ends, probably persuaded Parliament that this was more acceptable
to the rioters.43 If indeed this had been an aim of the rioters, as well as that
of Gell, it fits in with some of the demands the club movement, and the gentry
petitions which a few months earlier, pressured the king to keep locally
collected taxes within the area for regional use. Royalist excise was collected
in the region, and there is some limited evidence for its organisation and
implementation. However, as it came into force just as the royalist cause went
into decline in the north midlands, its effects seem not to have been prolonged
enough to have provoked complaint.
We need other explanations for the absence of clubmen risings. Absence
does seem to support Professor Hutton's assertion that the Club phenomena
were individualist in their composition, demands and behaviour. That there
were no risings in the midlands at a time when there were so many of the
prerequisites found in areas marked by Club risings, would suggest that there
were particular circumstances and sets of circumstances which did not occur
within the midlands. The answer may lie between the two extremes of class
conscious risings and individual self-expression. Risings elsewhere undoubt-
edly had several things in common. The clubmen and women in all cases were
defending themselves and their communities against damaging outside forces.
They were relating their own personal circumstances and those shared by their
neighbours, to the general instability within the state represented by a break-
down in government. Risings were organised and led by those involved in
the lower, community levels of local government, high and petty constables
such as high constable Thomas Careless of Broxash, prominent in the Her-
efordshire club movement. They were also the people charged with admin-
istering the war efforts at community level. This suggests that the club risings
are an example of a clash caused by there being two concepts of order even
in war-time. The order of the constables and local communities being at
variance with that of the central representatives of order - in this case royalist
and parliamentarian authorities rather than traditional functionaries of gov-
ernment. In this circumstance the clubman constables and their neighbours
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represented order and the soldiers, commissioners and committeemen disor-
der. In the north midlands, whilst the centre tottered and changed its face,
it certainly never fully collapsed or embraced unacceptable practices as it did
elsewhere.
Absence of prominent roman catholic figures, removed one other area of
contention. The Worcestershire Clubmen exhibited 'extraordinary venom' in
their attacks on catholics.44 Hutton identifies the prominence of the earl of
Shrewsbury, in the Marcher Association as a major cause of the Clubman
activity there: powerful roman catholics were an unacceptable part of gov-
ernment. Although Henry Hastings, Lord Loughborough had been accused
of favouring catholics in his forces, the accusations did not stick and whilst
there were two roman catholic colonels in his army, the overall proportion
in his officer corps remained low at as little as 15%. There were no catholics
in the administration. The one exception was Thomas Leveson at Dudley who
was widely described as a 'rob-carrier', and who managed to persuade the
king to make him high sheriff in 1645, but who was generally kept isolated
by the commission of array, effectively localising opposition to his presence
in the area.45 In fact, Leveson was perhaps the nearest thing the region got
to the other spark for club activity, the militant swordsman who like Barnabas
Scudamore at Hereford provoked armed local opposition to his heavy-handed
policies. Leveson's isolation and the actions taken by the king and princes
Rupert and Maurice to bring him into line prevented any escalated action
against him.
This all seems to suggest that a combination of general factors and specific
factors were necessary to prompt people into taking up arms against the
protagonists. Whilst the general causes of the civil war, deprivation, uncer-
tainty and heavy burdens, combined a decline in stability and confused control
were to be found in the north midlands, particularly after Summer 1644, other
more specific grievances were absent. In the north midlands circumstances
surrounding the royalist defeat and determination by both sides to ameliorate
the worst effects of the war mitigated these problems. For a significant amount
of time the consensus between centre and locality obtained: roman catholics
were rare, no colonel or governor was too arbitrary in his actions, and the
needs of Lord Goring's forces were incorporated into an effective logistical
framework and thus he did not engage in the kind of arbitrary taxation which
was, later in the war, to provoke the people of the south west into rising.
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